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26 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

likely to recur. But we believe that, if it does, its rejection can
be placed on grounds which would not again permit of dissent.
II
By

KENNETH C. SZARS*

Dean Wigmore's comment on the Macintosh case considered
in the light (or the heat) of other comments on this and the
Schwimmer case' seems to demonstrate that the subject matter is
very likely to kindle the emotions. Accordingly, dispassionate
consideration and an objective judgment become difficult.
Considerable could be written in a critical analysis of Colonel
Wigmore's comment. Suffice to say at this point that he seems to
have overstated his argument when he refers to the "triple inapplicability" of the argument in the minority opinion as rendered
by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes concerning the tradition of the country with reference to a certain type of religious objectors. The
distinction that has been made in federal legislation in this country
between conscientious objectors and members of a well-recognized
religious sect which is opposed to war was set forth by Mr. Donald
B. MacGuineas in a recent number of this review. 7 The writer,
however, does not understand that Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and
other members of the Supreme Court who agreed with him were
making any argument that Mr. Macintosh's case was controlled
by the notion that he, as a possible conscientious objector, was
nevertheless entitled to take the oath and be admitted to citizenship.
On the contrary the argument of the minority was that the matter
should be considered from the point of view of a person who in
the future might apply for citizenship and who -as a member of
a well-recognized religious sect opposed to war in any form would
be able to take the position that he, though an alien, is in the same
class as many citizens of the United States who have been for a
long time exempt from combatant service. From this point of
view the writer does not think that the argument of the minority
was inapplicable. However, the main purpose of this additional
comment will be to emphasize a few observations which have already found their way into print. Dean Carpenter's letter in the
American Bar Association Journal' and Professor Freund's re*Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
6. U. S. v. Schtwimmer' (1929) 279 U. S. 644, 49 Sup. Ct. 448, 73 L.
Ed. 889.
7. (1931) 25 ILLINoIs LAW REWviz 723.
8. 17 Am. Bar Ass'n Jour. 551.
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view of the Schwimmer case9 have anticipated this comment to
some extent, at least.
In the first place the dogmatism of Mr. Wigmore's remarks
seems to be unjustified. In the Schwimrmer case (which has been
distinguished from the other two cases), the district judge and
six judges of the Supreme Court were on one side; three judges
of the Circuit Court of Appeals and three judges of the Supreme
Court were on the other side. In the Macintosh case the district
judge and five members of the Supreme Court were of one opinion; three judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals and four judges
of the Supreme Court were of the other opinion. The line-up in
the Bland case was the same as the Macintosh case except that a
presumably different district judge was unfavorable to naturalization. All of this would seem to demonstrate that the question is
one upon which able and fair-minded individuals will differ.
Regardless of this, it seems to be reasonably clear that the
controversy is pathetically futile. The tangible result to date, so far
as known, has been the exclusion from citizenship of two women
and one man, all of whom are among the best for citizenship save
for the notion of supporting some future war which may not occur
during their lives. If Mr. Macintosh and Miss Bland, at least,
had crossed their fingers and had taken the oath without explaining their ideas, even the Chicago Tribune might have been contented. Thus, they pay the penalty for having sensitive consciences; the very quality that should make them desirable citizens
in all things except possibly one is the quality that results in their
exclusion from citizenship. The pity of it is that this barrier being
largely subjective will mean nothing to such individuals as "Mops"
Volpe. The oath thus tends to work inversely, i. e., ke~ps out the
best in some instances and is no barrier to the worst applicants.
Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the oath will mean anything significant to the large mass of applicants. Most applicants
probably will regard the oath as a part of the rigmarole of being
admitted, and if impressed at all will not be too much impressed.
The truth seems to be that despite a few interesting cases, this
country must take its chances about the admission of aliens who
may resist governmental processes in future wars. The causes of
opposition to war are so various, the state of public opinion, locally
and nationally, on the subject is so fluctuating that an average
person cannot be expected to visualize the circumstances that will
9. 7 N. Y. U. L.Q. R. 157.
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surround future wars. Then why exclude only very cautious individuals with New England consciences?
An oath seems to be an unsatisfactory means of testing the
likelihood of good citizenship. It has broken down as a means of
obtaining truth from a witness. If an oath is needed in naturalization proceedings for some formal purpose why not make it as
colorless as possible and then resort to other means to ascertain
the essential facts concerning the applicant? We need a more objective method of testing. Section 4 of the naturalization act
provides for ascertainment of the facts about a person. Probably
it should be amplified. Search the man's record and ascertain how
he has lived, abroad as well as in this country. If all of this is
done now under departmental regulations, then nothing more can
be done except to perfect the technique and so far as possible
choose the best who offer themselves. Why strain at an oath which
will result only in eliminating some of our best prospects?
III
By ERNST FREUND*

Two collateral questions are suggested by the foregoing two
comments upon the decision in the Macintosh case as well as by
the decision itself: First: If the law requires as a condition precedent to admission either to citizenship or to any
other position of public trust the taking of a prescribed form
of oath, is it the presumable intent of the legislature that
there shall or may be an inquiry into the truth or falsity
of the oath? By the common law of evidence it is legitimate
to ascertain whether the sanctions of the oath are operative in
point of conscience, but the power of inquiry stops at that point.
The terms of the oath prescribed by the Naturalization Act are
admittedly vague and fall short of any standard of legal precision.
The eventuality of a defense of the Constitution and laws of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, is .as remote, as the bearing of true faith and allegiance to the same is
subjective and undefinable. Phrases such as these may be appropriate to a solemn utterance meant to impress moral sense and
conscience, but defy minute and logical analysis. The statute in
the fourth paragraph of section 4, where it prescribes, not the terms
*Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

